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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

NICHOLAS CONLEY and PATTY OLGUIN, :
Petitioners/Appellants,

:

v.

:

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DIVISION OF MEDICAID AND
HEALTH FINANCING,

:

Respondent/Appellee.

Case No. 20100496

:
:

Petition for Review of Final Agency Action of the Utah Department of Health,
Division of Medicaid and Health Care Financing

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Petition for Review of this Medicaid claim is taken from the Final Agency
Order of the Department of Health, Division of Medicaid and Health Financing, issued on
May 20,2010. R. 97-98. The order adopted the Recommended Decision of the
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), R. 99-109, denying petitioners' requests for Medicaidprovided speech augmentative communication devices (SACDs). Petitioners' timely
petition for review was filed on June 18,2010. Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a) (West
2009) gives this Court jurisdiction over "the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies."

-
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ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL
Did the Utah Department of Health unreasonably deny SACDs for petitioners as
non-covered benefits in violation of the Medicaid Act's "reasonable standards" and
"amount, duration, or scope," or comparability of services, requirements?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "This appeal requires us to construe federal and state
statutes, regulations and rules governing the Medicaid program. Thus, it presents
questions of law" that are reviewed for correctness. Bleazardv. Utah Dep't of Health,
861 P.2d 1048,1049(UtahApp. 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the
issue before the Court is contained in the body of this brief
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
Petitioners each filed a timely Request for Hearing/Agency Action after having

sought and been denied an SACD. R. 5 and 30 (denial: Conley), 1 (Request for Hearing:
Conley), 8 and 44 (denial: Olguin), 7 (Request for Hearing: Olguin). Following the
filing of prehearing memoranda (R. 13-47: petitioners; 50-77: respondent; 81-96:
petitioners' reply), the matter was submitted to the ALJ. The ALJ issued a Recommended
Decision on May 18,2010, affirming the denials as reasonable on the ground that under
Utah's Medicaid program, the devices are non-covered benefits for individuals over 21
years of age. R. 99-109. The Utah Department of Health, Division of Medicaid and
2
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Health Financing ( Department) reviewed and adopted the Recommended Decision in its
entirety two days later. R. 97-98. This appeal followed.
B.

Statement of Relevant Facts
The ALJ stated that "[t]he facts are not in dispute. Both Petitioner [sic] and

Respondent submitted statements of fact, and while in different format, contain the same
information. Those fact statements are hereby adopted for the purposes of this decision."
R. 103. As enumerated in Respondent's prehearing memorandum, the facts are as
follows:
Nicholas Conley
1. Nicholas is a 22 year old male with spastic quadriplegia related to
cerebral palsy.
2. Nicholas has limited motor control and uses a power wheelchair for
mobility purposes.
3. Nicholas is not able to produce any intelligible words due to motor
difficulties secondary to his medical diagnosis.
4. Nicholas uses a Dynamite 3100 augmented speech device to
communicate.
5. Nicholas* Dynamite 3100 is seven years old and not functioning properly
and has a recent history of needing repeated repairs.
6. When the Dynamite 3100 is not working, Nicholas attempts to express
himself using gestures, facial expressions and pointing to objects.
7. The cost of repairing Nicholas1 Dynamite 3100 far exceeds the cost of a
new device.
8. Based on an evaluation, Nicholas's care providers determined that a
Dynavox VMax currently will meet Nicholas* communication needs.
9. A request for prior authorization for a Dynavox VMax was submitted to
the respondent.
10. The respondent denied the request on February 22, 2010, stating that
the service is not a covered benefit.
Patty Olguin
11. Patty is a 38 year old female who was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis
attheageof8.

3
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12. In 2002, Patty suffered a stroke during a surgical operation to her leg
which caused severe dysarthria, a motor speech disorder resulting from a
neurological injury.
13. Patty's care provider recently evaluated her communication ability and
determined that a Dynavox V and related accessories are necessary to meet
her functional communication needs.
14. A request for a prior authorization for the Dynavox V was submitted to
the respondent.
15. The request was denied on February 22, 2010, stating the service is not
a covered benefit.
R.51-52.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioners1 argument begins by "refraining" the ALJ's decision and starting from
the premise that all state Medicaid provisions must be measured against the Medicaid
Act's "reasonable standards" requirement in fulfillment of the Act's broad objectives: to
furnish medical assistance, rehabilitation, and other services to help disabled individuals
"attain or retain capability for independence or self-care." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396-1 (West,
Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L. 111-203 and 111-240) approved 10-5-10).
Petitioners complain that the ALJ erroneously started from the principle that states have
substantial discretion in developing and implementing their plans and, by doing so, gave
undue weight to "specific Medicaid statutes, regulations, Utah state administrative rules,
and the Agency's policies." Pet'r Brief at 11. But to accept petitioners' framework would
deprive states of any of the discretion to which the Act entitles them.
The ALJ correctly focused on the precise requirements of the Act, as implemented
by Utah's federally approved plan. She then looked at whether those requirements

4
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violated the Act's general provisions regarding "reasonable standards" and "amount,
duration, or scope" of coverage, concluding that they did not. Petitioners have not
addressed the ALJPs rationale for concluding that neither the "reasonable standards" nor
the "amount, duration, or scope" provisions are applicable to the question of whether
optional coverage can be restricted on the basis of age.
The ALJfs conclusions are supported by the relevant statutes, regulations, and
rules. Under the federal act and associated regulations, speech pathology services are not
a mandatory coverage category for adults. Even under plans that cover "home health
services," federal regulations defining that term explicitly exclude speech pathology
services from mandatory coverage, and Utah does not cover them as a general benefit.
While the Act does require necessary health care services to correct or ameliorate defects
and conditions identified in Medicaid-eligible individuals under the age of 21-regardless
of whether those services are covered under the state plan-nothing in the Act mandates
extension of optional coverage to adults. If it did, such coverage would no longer be
optional-a result contrary to the plain language of the Act. Utah statutes and rules do no
more than implement what is required and what is permitted under the federal legislation.
Moreover, Utah's Medicaid program, in compliance with statutory requirements, has been
approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, confirming that it is consistent
with federal Medicaid law.
For these reasons, as more fully explained below, the decision of the Utah
Department of Health warrants this Court's affirmance.
5
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ARGUMENT
I. THE "REASONABLE STANDARDS" REQUIREMENT IS
UNRELATED TO AGE-BASED RESTRICTIONS ON OPTIONAL
COVERAGE
Petitioners' argument relies substantially on the concept that the Act's "reasonable
standards" provision mandates a general reasonableness test for all Medicaid decisions.
In making that assumption, petitioners fail to acknowledge the statutory context of the
"reasonable standards" language. A careful examination shows that, as the ALJ correctly
concluded, the "reasonable standards" requirement speaks to "financial eligibility such as
income and resources, and insures that individuals are not wrongly denied general
assistance on the basis of their financial standing. It does not reach the issue of medical
eligibility or need, and there is no question that both Petitioners are financially qualified
to receive Medicaid." R. 104. To the extent that the "reasonable standards" requirement
applies to "determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the
plan[J" it mandates only that the extent of medical assistance is not unfairly curtailed on
the basis of inequitably applied financial criteria. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(17) (West,
Westlaw through P L . 111-264 (excludmgPX. 111-203, 111-257, and 111-259) approved
10-8-10). But petitioners' financial qualification for services is not at issue here.
The text of the statute supports the ALJ's conclusion. The "reasonable standards"
requirement is found in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(17), which sets forth eligibility criteria
for financial assistance under four subsections. While subsection (A) requires that the
eligibility criteria be consistent with the objectives of the subchapter, subsections (B),
6
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(C), and (D) set out limitations on what income and resources can be considered and how
they should be evaluated. Nothing in the text suggests a broader applicability to nonfinancial decisions. The "reasonable standards" requirement lacks any bearing on the
validity of a limitation based on age.
Petitioners contend that the Tenth Circuit Court's decision in Hern v. Beye, 57 F.3d
906 (10th Cir. 1995), and the federal district court decision in Utah Women's Clinic, Inc.
v. Graham, 892 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Utah 1995), support their position that the "reasonable
standards" requirement limits the state's discretion to deny them access to SACDs. But,
as the Hern court noted, "This circuit, as well as several other courts, has interpreted Title
XIX and its accompanying regulations as imposing a general obligation on states to fund
those mandatory coverage services that are medically necessary." Hern, 57 F.3d at 911
(emphasis added). See also id. ("Title XIX . . . mandates that [seven] basic categories of
medical assistance be provided to all categorically needy persons when the assistance is
medically necessary.'") (quoting Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 549 (8th Cir. 1980))
(alterations in Herri). Utah Women fs Clinic does no more than follow Hern.
The seven mandatory services are inpatient services, outpatient services,
laboratory and x-ray services, nursing facility services, physicians' services, nursemidwife services (if authorized by state law), and services of certified pediatric or family
nurse practitioners. But these categories do not include the provision of SACDs. Instead,
federal regulations specifically address SACDs in 42 C.F.R. 440.110, which defines the
optional category of physical therapy and related services found at 42 U.S.C.A.
7
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§ 1396d(a)(l 1). Under 42 C.F.R. 440.110 (c) (2010), captioned "Services for individuals
with speech, hearing, and language disorders[,]" subsection (1) includes "any necessary
supplies and equipment." A second optional category, found at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1396d(a)(7), is "home health care services," a category that Utah has chosen to cover.
The federal regulations defining that term show that, under this optionally-covered
category, nursing service, home health aide service, and medical supplies, equipment, and
appliances suitable for home use must be covered, but speech pathology services need not
be. See 42 C.F.R. 440.70(b)(4) (2010). Whatever Hern may mean with respect to the
seven mandatory coverage categories, it has no applicability to the optional services
petitioners seek.
McMillan v. McCrimon, 807 F. Supp. 475 (CD. 111. 1992), cited without analysis
by petitioners, is not to the contrary. The McMillan case dealt with Illinois1 refusal to
accept applications for the home services program (HSP) of the state's Medicaid plan, an
optional coverage category that Illinois chose to provide, under an emergency budget
reduction measure. The court concluded that "[tjhe fact that the HSP is an optional
service does not exempt it from the requirements of section 1396a(a)(8)." McMillan, 807
F. Supp. at 481-82. Section 1396a(a)(8) requires that a state plan must "provide that all
individuals wishing to make application for medical assistance under the plan shall have
opportunity to do so, and that such assistance shall be furnished with reasonable
promptness to all eligible individuals^]" 42 U.S,C.A. § 1396a(a)(8) (West, Westlaw
throughP.L. 111-264(excludingP.L. 111-203, 111-257, and 111-259)approved
8
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10-8-10).: In the present case, petitioners were not precluded from applying for medical
assistance, nor were they denied benefits for which they are eligible. McMillan has no
application here.
Even if the Court were to conclude that the "reasonable standards" requirement
applies to medical, as well as financial, decisions, the rules of statutory construction do
not permit the result petitioners seek. As the ALJ correctly pointed out, in resolving a
conflict between two legal provisions, the more specific provision will prevail over the
more general. R. 104. The regulations making coverage of speech pathology services
and their related supplies and equipment optional are specifically targeted in a way that
the general "reasonable standards" requirement is not. Under well established Utah
precedents, these explicit regulations must govern: "We acknowledge the well-settled
principle of statutory construction that Vhen two provisions address the same subject
matter and one provision is general while the other is specific, the specific provision
controls.1" Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2007 UT 72,
% 19, 167 P.3d 1080 (quoting Dairyland Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 882
P.2d 1143, 1146 (Utah 1994); accord Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, f 17, 5 P.3d 616.
Given the clear language placing SACDs outside the mandatory coverage categories, and
even outside required coverage under the optional category of home health care services,
petitioners' "reasonable standards" argument cannot succeed.
Nor does William T. v. Taylor, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (N.D. Ga. 2000), establish
that limitation of SACDs to minors violates the "reasonable standards" provision.
9
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Acknowledging that speech pathology services are an optional category, the court in that
case found it "undisputed that Georgia has elected to cover these services." William T.,
465 F. Supp. 2d at 1273. The court noted that "the State does not oppose plaintiffs'
contention that ACDs should be covered under Georgia's plan for medical assistance." Id.
at 1285. See also id. at 1286 (observing that "[defendants do not contradict" plaintiffs'
contention that ACDs meet all the criteria for durable medical equipment and that
"defendants do not address plaintiffs' contention that ACDs meet the criteria for
prosthetic devices"); id. at 1287 (stating that "[a]s defendants do not address plaintiffs'
contention that ACDs meet the criteria for SLP [speech language pathology] equipment, it
appears that they do not oppose plaintiffs' [summary judgment] motion in this regard.").
Moreover, the court expressly "reserve[d] ruling on the scope of any injunctive relief to
be granted in this case until after the completion of the parties' efforts to draft a
reasonable ACD coverage criteria [sic]". Id. at 1289. The court left open the question of
whether limiting SACD coverage to beneficiaries under the age of 21 would violate the
Medicaid Act's "reasonable standards" and "amount, duration, and scope" provisions or a
September 4, 1998 policy letter from the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)
providing guidance on coverage of mandatory services. Id. at 1288-89. In fact, the court
expressed skepticism about the letter's entitlement to deference, but concluded it was
bound by Eleventh Circuit precedent deferring to HCFA transmittal letters. See Point II,
below. In light of these circumstances, it is not surprising that the court did not address
the language of 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(4), exempting speech pathology services from
10
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mandatory coverage under the optional category of home health services (if included in
the state plan). Given Georgia's apparent lack of opposition to including SAGDs in the
sate plan and the absence of a definitive ruling regarding the coverage criteria, William T
bears little weight as to what "reasonable standards" require.
II. THE "AMOUNT, DURATION, OR SCOPE" REQUIREMENT FOR
COMPARABLE SERVICES HAS NO BEARING ON AGE-BASED
LIMITATIONS
Petitioners also assert that the denial of SACDs violates the Act's provision
requiring comparability of services-that medical assistance be the same in amount,
duration, or scope among all qualifying individuals. However, petitioners have not
argued that they are being deprived of benefits that are being provided to other qualifying
persons. Instead, they argue that they are being denied SACDs solely on the basis of age.
But, as the ALJ correctly observed, "denial on the basis of age is not one of the
prohibitions contained in this provision." R. 105. Instead, under 42 C.F.R. 440.230(c)
(2010), "[t]he Medicaid agency may not arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount, duration,
or scope of a required service under §§ 440.210 [for the categorically needy] and 440.220
[for the medically needy] to an otherwise eligible recipient solely because of the
diagnosis, type of illness, or condition" (emphasis added). Petitioners1 argument is doubly
flawed: first, because the services they seek are not required, and second, because
nothing in the comparability language forecloses the application of an age-based standard.
Consequently, the "amount, duration, or scope" requirement does nothing to assist their
age-based claim. Petitioners have provided no binding authority supporting the
11
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proposition that an age-based limitation on an optional service is a violation of the
"amount, duration, or scope" requirement.
Petitioners' citation to Hodecker v. Blum, 525 F. Supp. 867 (N.D.N.Y. 1981), is not
on point. In Hodecker\ the issue was whether the state's Commissioner of Social Services
could treat the income of financially responsible relatives differently in the process of
qualifying adults and minors for services. The comparability requirement was violated by
the application of different methodologies to determine adults' and minors' financial
eligibility. The case has no bearing on whether different services can be limited to
minors.
Sobkyv. Smoley, 855 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. Cal. 1994), is equally unavailing. In
Sobky, the issue was whether the state could permit individual counties to determine, in
their discretion, "the appropriate mix and level of drug abuse services needed in the
community." 855 F. Supp. at 1128. The court concluded that the local discretion given to
counties ran afoul of the Medicaid requirement that a state plan "shall be in effect in all
political subdivisions of the State, and, if administered by them, be mandatory upon
them[J" 42 U.S.C.A. § I396a(a)(l) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-264 (excluding
P.L. 111-203, 111-257, and 111-259) approved 10-8-10). There is no question in
petitioners' case that the same standards are applied statewide.
42 CF.R. § 440.200 implements the statute requiring comparability of services. It
distinguishes between mandatory and optional coverage categories. See 42 CF.R.
§ 440.210 (identifying the seven statutory coverage categories mandated for the
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categorically needy, plus mandatory coverage for certain pregnancy-related services and
services for eligible aliens); 42 C.F.R. § 440.220 (identifying required services for the
medically needy under state plans that choose to cover them). The mandatory services for
the medically needy, which Utah's plan covers, do include home health services, as
defined in 42 C.F.R. § 440.70, for those individuals entitled to skilled nursing facility
services. But under home health services, as explained in Point I, above, coverage for
speech pathology services is optional, not mandated. See 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(4). And,
under 42 C.F.R. § 440.110(c)(1) (2010), those optional services for individuals with
speech disorders include "any necessary supplies and equipment."
42 C.F.R. § 441.15 (2010), cited by petitioners, is not to the contrary. It regulates
home health services "as defined in § 440.70 of this subchapter." Although subsection
(a)(3) requires coverage for medical supplies, equipment, and appliances, that
requirement is subject to section 440.70's definition of home health services-which, as
shown above, excludes speech pathology services (and, under section 440.110(c)(1),
related supplies and equipment). See 42 C.F.R. § 440.70(b)(4). To read the regulation as
requiring coverage of SACDs for adults would render subsection (b)(4) a nullity-a result
this Court does not condone. "In asking us to rule that an entire sentence of the statute
had absolutely no meaning at all, [defendants] have ignored our fundamental duty to give
effect, if possible, to every word of the statute." Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245,252
n.ll (Utah 1988); see also State v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60, 63 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting
Madsen).
13
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Utah's Medicaid plan complies folly with controlling federal law. Under Utah
Admin. Code R414-54-4(1), "Speech-language pathology services are available only to
clients who are pregnant women or who are individuals eligible under the Early and
Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment Program." Petitioners are neither.
The Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) Program is
established by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(a)(4)(B) to provide services as defined in subsection
(r) to eligible individuals under the age of 21. Subsections (r)( 1) through (4) contain
minimum requirements for screening, vision, dental, and hearing services. Subsection
(r)(5) requires state plans to provide M[s]uch other necessary health care, diagnostic
services, treatment, and other measures described in subsection (a) of this section to
correct or ameliorate defects and physical and mental illnesses and conditions discovered
by the screening services, whether or not such services are covered under the State plan"
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396d(r)(5) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-255 (excluding P.L. 111-203
and 111-240) approved 10-5-10) (emphasis added). Subsection (a) includes all 29
enumerated categories of services, only seven of which are mandatory coverage
categories. See Point I, above. In other words, while the Act mandates that EPSDT
recipients be provided coverage in all 29 categories-optional as well as mandatory-it
permits states to differentiate between minors and adults by providing coverage under
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only the seven mandated categories for non-EPSDT individuals-persons over the age of
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Lankford v. Sherman, one of the cases cited by petitioners, makes this distinction
clear. In Lankford, disabled adult Medicaid recipients challenged a state regulation that
precluded durable medical equipment (DME) as a stand-alone benefit except to
individuals who are blind, pregnant, needy children, or recipients of home health care
benefits under the Act. A limited list of DME was available to all other adult Medicaid
recipients. In an action seeking to enjoin the regulation, the court noted the plaintiffs'
agreement that under the Act, the state "may lawfully provide additional benefits only to
needy children and pregnant women[,]fr Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 502 (8th Cir.
2006)-precisely what Utah's plan does here.
Petitioners point to Meyers v. Reagan, 116 F.2d 241 (8th Cir. 1985), as precedent
for requiring a state plan to fund SACDs for adults. In that case, the Eighth Circuit noted
that Iowa's Medicaid plan included the optional category of physical therapy and related
services. Observing that related services included professional assistance for persons
with speech disorders, the court concluded that Iowa could not deny the plaintiff an

^ h e coverage Utah provides for pregnant women is equally unavailing to
petitioners. Under the Act, a state plan that makes available to pregnant women services
relating to any conditions that may complicate pregnancy does not require the state to
supply "such services of the same amount, duration, and scope, to any other individuals,
provided such services are made available (in the same amount, duration, and scope) to
all pregnant women covered under the State planf.]" 42U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(10)(G)(V)
(West, Westlaw through PX. 111-264 (excluding PX. 111-203,111^257, and 111-259)
approved 10-8-10).
15
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SACD. Meyers is distinguishable from the case at bar on two grounds. First, there was
no issue in Meyers regarding age. Second, Meyers was decided in 1985-four years before
the EPSDT program, requiring the provision of a broad range of services to minors
regardless of whether they were made available to nonpregnant adults, was strengthened
by 1989 amendments to the federal Medicaid Act. Under these circumstances, Meyers
cannot serve as precedent to mandate the expansion of EPSDT services to adult Medicaid
recipients. In addition, .Meyers, like William T, contains no mention, let alone analysis,
of 42 C.F,R. 440.70(b)(4)ts exclusion of speech pathology services.
Nor does Fred C. v. Texas Health and Human Servs. Comm'n, 924 F. Supp. 788
(W.D. Tex. 1996), require the result petitioners seek. In reaching its conclusion that
SACDs could not be restricted to minors under the EPSDT program, the district court
cited to Salgado v. Kirschner, 179 Ariz. 301, 878 P.2d 659 (1994). But the Salgado case
dealt with organ transplants, which are governed by a different statute requiring like
treatment for similarly situated individuals. See 878 P.2d at 662. Moreover, the Fred C
opinion to which petitioners cite was vacated and remanded by the Fifth Circuit for a
determination of whether the plaintiff was a qualified recipient of home health services.
Fred C. v. Texas Health and Human Servs. Comm'n, 117 F.3d 1416 (5th Cir. 1997). The
district court's decision on remand was essentially the same as the former decision. Fred
C. v. Texas Health and Human Servs. Comm% 988 F. Supp. 1032 (W.D. Tex. 1997). On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit concluded that it was bound by its prior remand order not to
revisit issues outside the scope of the remand. It did, however, state: "Accordingly, in
16
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affirming the district court's second summary judgment, we are not passing on the
correctness of, nor do we adopt, the district court's opinion; we hold merely that
reconsideration of the issues presented in the first appeal is barred under the law of the
case doctrine." Fred C. v. Texas Health and Human Servs. Conim'n, 167 F.3d 537 (5th
Cir. 1998), 1998 WL 915385 at *3. The Fifth Circuit's unenthusiastic affirmance of the
district court's opinion suggests that it may have arrived at a different decision had it
exercised jurisdiction 'to engage in a full review.
Reading the statute as broadly as petitioners suggest would obliterate the
distinction between mandated and optional categories, rendering the latter inoperative.
The Utah Supreme Court has cautioned against such a result under "the rule of
construction requiring us to give meaning to all provisions in a statute." A.C. Fin., Inc. v.
Salt Lake County, 948 P.2d 771, 779 (Utah 1997). As the court observed, "'any
interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous is to be
avoided.'" State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995) (quoting United States v.
Rawlings, S21 F.2d 1543, 1545 (11th Cir. 1987)). Because petitioners'interpretation
would nullify the state's statutory discretion under the Act's plain language, it cannot be
credited.
III. BECAUSE SACDs ARE SEPARATELY DEFINED IN FEDERAL
REGULATIONS, THEY NEED NOT BE COVERED AS DURABLE
MEDICAL EQUIPMENT OR PROSTHETIC DEVICES
"'When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it
expresses, and no room is left for construction.'" Salt Lake Child and Family Therapy
17
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Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) (quoting Hanchett v.
Burbidge, 59 Utah 127,135, 202 PI 377, 379-80 (1921)). Because the language of the
federal regulations explicitly and unambiguously addresses equipment related to speech
pathology services, there is no room to speculate that SACDs may also fit into other
categories of coverage such as durable medical equipment (DME) or prosthetic devices.
Even if they could, the more specific provisions are controlling, as shown above.
Petitioners concede that ff[t]here is no definition of DME in the Medicaid Act or its
implementing regulations." Pet'r Brief at 16. As defined in Utah's administrative code,
'"Durable medical equipment' or fDMEf means equipment that: (a) can withstand repeated
use; (b) is primarily and customarily used to serve a medical purpose; (c) generally is not
useful to a person in the absence of an illness or injury; and (d) is suitable for use in the
home." Utah Admin. Code R414-70-2(l). The Department does not deny that SACDs
may fit under this description. But so may a number of other devices or kinds of
equipment that Medicaid does not cover for nonpregnant adults, such as hearing aids and
eyeglasses. While durable medical equipment must meet the defining criteria, petitioners
make the logical error of presuming that anything meeting the criteria must be a covered
device. As explained in Points I and II, above, SACDs, as equipment necessary to speech
pathology services, are specifically excluded from the coverage mandated by 42 C.F.R.
§ 440.210(a)(1) for home health services for the categorically needy. That they may meet
the definitional criteria for DME does not change this fact.
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The same principles apply to petitioners* attempt to categorize SACDs as
prosthetic devices. Under federal regulations, prosthetic devices are
replacement, corrective, or supportive devices prescribed by a physician or
other licensed practitioner of the healing arts within the scope of his
practice as defined by State law to~
(1) Artificially replace a missing portion of the body;
(2) Prevent or correct physical deformity or malfunction; or
(3) Support a weak or deformed portion of the body.
42 C.F.R. § 440.120(c) (2010). But, as above, even if the definition can be construed to
include SACDs, it does not alter the fact that coverage of SACDs falls outside the federal
mandate. Meeting the criteria for definition as a prosthetic device is not the same as
meeting the criteria for coverage. Petitioners1 argument proves the point. Petitioners state
that 49 states cover SACDs for adults as DME, and seven states cover them both as DME
and prosthetic devices. Pet'r Brief at 15. If the definitional criteria were, by themselves,
sufficient to require inclusion of SACDs, every state would have to cover them under
both categories.
That other states may have chosen to cover SACDs as DME or prosthetic devices
is irrelevant to whether Utah's plan complies with federal law. As the Department
explained in its Prehearing Response Memorandum, in order to participate in the
Medicaid program, state Medicaid plans must be approved by the United States
Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS). R. 52. This approval "indicates federal confirmation that a state's Medicaid
program is in compliance with federal Medicaid law." R. 54. As a CMS-approved plan,
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R. 58, Utah's Medicaid plan has been scrutinized and passed for compliance with federal
standards. If limiting SACDs to pregnant women and EPSDT recipients were not in
keeping with federal law, the state plan could not have been approved. And ,f[w]ith
Utah's state plan not providing the optional service of speech pathology to general
Medicaid recipients, Utah Medicaid would be out of compliance with its state plan and
federal Medicaid law if Utah Medicaid began covering speech augmentation devices that
fall within this non-covered service." R. 54.
IV. PETITIONERS'CLAIM THAT THE DEPARTMENT'S MEDICAL
SUPPLIES LIST MAKES AN UNLISTED DEVICE UNAVAILABLE TO
THEM IS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
f

"It is axiomatic that, before a party may advance an issue on appeal, the record

must clearly show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a manner sufficient to
obtain a ruling thereon.'" Holmstrom v. C.R. England, Inc., 2000 UT App 239, f 26, 8
P.3d 281 (quoting Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 116 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah App. 1989))
(emphasis omitted and added in Holmstrom). On appeal, petitioners raise for the first
time a claim that the Department's list of medical supplies constitutes a categorical denial
of all unlisted devices that violates federal Medicaid guidelines under a September 4,
1998 letter to state Medicaid directors. This contention appears nowhere in the
administrative record. As this Court further observedin Holmstrom,
Moreover, the party must specifically raise the issue, such that it is brought
"to a/level of consciousness'before the trial court.,f This requirement
f
serve[s] the interests ofjudicial economy and orderly procedure" by not
only giving the trial court a chance to correct error, but by making the
parties "crystallize issues prior to appeal." When issues are not brought to
2G
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the trial court's attention in a timely manner, they are "deemed waived,
precluding this court from considering their merits on appeal."
Id. (internal citations omitted) (alteration in Holmstrom). Because petitioners did not
raise and the ALJ did not rule on this issue in the course of the administrative
proceedings, petitioners have waived it for purposes of appeal.
Even if the Court chooses to address this newly raised claim, it is without merit.
Notably, the federal district court in William T. expressed doubt about the credibility of
the HCFAfs September 4, 1998 guidance letter, but concluded it was bound by the
Eleventh Circuit's demonstrated deference to HCFA transmittals:
This Court is somewhat skeptical about according a letter the same
deference as a regulation. In this court's experience, letters written by
officials in a bureaucracy are sometimes inconsistent with each other and
have not undergone the focus of a review and comment process that
accompanies the promulgation of a regulation. Chevroris deference toward
an administrative agency's interpretation already gives that agency great
power in effectively acting as a legislative body; further deferring to the
agency's letters interpreting its own regulations arguably expands Chevron
beyond its own language and beyond the limits of prudence. Indeed, the
Eleventh Circuit has noted that "a rule would be preferable," but has also
tempered this observation with a recognition that "the agency is not
required to promulgate rules pursuant to everysubsection of the widelyacknowledged complex Medicaid statute." The Eleventh Circuit has further
held that this is especially true when "HCFA spoke directly to the states on
this question through [a transmittal], which we recognize as administrative
practice." Accordingly, the Court believes that it must defer to the
transmittal letter in question.
William T., 465 F. Supp.2d at 1280 n.12 (internal citations omitted; alteration in original).
As in Fred C , this qualified endorsement suggests that a court not bound by precedent
may well reach a different conclusion regarding deference to the HCFA letter.
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In fact, the HCFA letter does not preclude states from developing and using nonexclusive lists of pre-approved DME, so long as they provide a reasonable and
meaningful procedure for requesting nonlisted items. 465 F. Supp. at 1279. That is
exactly what happened in the present case. The record shows that the letters denying
petitioners1 requests for SACDs apprised petitioners of their right to appeal the decision
(R. 30 and 44), and both petitioners took advantage of that opportunity by appealing the
decision to the ALJ. The administrative process provided them the opportunity to submit
prehearing briefs and participate in an evidentiary hearing. The ALPs recommended
decision informed petitioners that it would be automatically reviewed by the Department
director, R. 108, which resulted in a final agency order. R. 97-98. In light of those
extensive administrative proceedings, a claim that petitioners lacked a reasonable and
meaningful procedure for requesting the devices is unsupportable. The process is not
unreasonable or meaningless simply because it did not yield petitioners' preferred result.
CONCLUSION
"This court cannot ignore or strike down an act because it is either wise or unwise.
The wisdom or lack of wisdom is for the legislature to determine. If the act is unjust,
amendments to correct the inequities should be made by the legislature and not by judicial
interpretation." Masich v. U.S. Smelting, Refining & Mining Co., 113 Utah 101,126, 191
P.2d 612, 625 (1948); see also Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, ^ 23, 61 P.3d 989
(quoting Masich). That the legislature has chosen to commit the state's limited resources
to providing enhanced medical assistance for children, in compliance with its duties under
22
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the Medicaid Act's EPSDT program, is not a reason to second-guess the legislative
wisdom. Because the controlling statutes, rules, and regulations give the state discretion
over whether to cover optional Medicaid categories for general Medicaid recipients, the
Department correctly determined that the rule providing SACDs only to minors does not
violate the Medicaid Act. The Department therefore respectfully requests the Court to
affirm its decision.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The Department believes oral argument is necessary due to the complexity of the
issue before the Court.
Dated this

day of January, 2011.

Nancy L. Kemp
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
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